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 1 Introduction
This paper seeks to understand what drives schooling decisions regarding higher education (that
is, secondary and tertiary education), and why the distribution of educational attainment greatly
di⁄ers with the level of development. In particular, Table 1 shows how attainment levels in primary,
secondary, and tertiary schools relate to per capita income. We can observe two clear patterns.
First, if we compare among all three attainment levels, agents in developing countries have at most
primary schooling. Second, secondary and tertiary schooling increase with income levels (i.e., about
23 percent of people in high-income countries had a tertiary degree, but less than 2 percent in
low-income countries).1
One possible explanation for this evidence is that when borrowing is expensive and secondary
and tertiary education are more costly than primary education ￿ which seems to be the case since
currently primary schooling is publicly provided in most countries and higher education is essentially
non-mandatory￿ individuals with low wealth have limited access to the educational investment
opportunities that are available to the rich (see, e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993). Another possible
explanation for the increased demand for educational attainment could be skill-biased technical
change. The shift in production technologies causes information technologies to be complementary
to employees with higher skill levels since it increases the returns to schooling, thereby creating an
incentive for more people to attain higher schooling levels (see, for example, Galor and Moav, 2000).
In this paper, we analyze an alternative explanation that posits cross-country di⁄erences in
the quality of the educational system to be a possible factor contributing to such patterns. As
preliminary evidence of how important the quality of education may be, we plot enrollment rates in
secondary education and a measure of educational quality in each country.2 The results are striking.
Figure 1 shows a positive correlation between educational quality and enrollment rates in secondary
schooling when the quality of education is relatively high ￿ a correlation that disappears when the
quality of the educational system is below a threshold level. Moreover, the upper and lower extremes
in the ￿gure also show that, on average, the countries with a high-quality educational system are
mainly the high-income OECD economies, whereas those with low-quality educational systems are
the less-developed countries.3
Motivated by these observations, we develop an analytical theory to study how the quality of
the educational system in￿ uences individuals￿decisions to invest in higher education, which in turn
1However, the share of individuals with maximum primary education was similar in poor and rich countries (30
percent in poor countries and 32 percent in rich economies).
2We then measure the quality of the educational system through scores in internationally comparable tests taken
from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). The enrollment rates in secondary education are taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
3A potential problem with these internationally comparable test scores is that they could measure innate abilities.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that average ability of students does not vary across countries. Second, even
assuming that high ability agents in developing countries would enter secondary schooling more often than low ability
agents in these countries, and that the average ability level of secondary students would decline as secondary education
expands, we would then expect a negative correlation between quality and enrollment rates across income levels. This
would imply that Figure 1 is still robust to these assumptions. On the other hand, the relationship in both ￿gures
holds even when controlling for the level of ￿nancial development and the number of years of compulsory secondary
education.
2Table 1
Highest education level attained (%), year 2000
Income Primary Secondary Tertiary
Low 30.07 11.26 1.83
Middle 43.62 24.43 10.07
High 31.67 41.50 23.34
Note: Attainment levels refer to the population 25 years and above
(Barro and Lee, 2001). The income classi￿cation is taken from the
World Bank, 2007, which divides economies into income groups
according to per capita gross national income.
a⁄ects the distribution of educational attainment and allows for di⁄erent path of development.
Speci￿cally, the objective of this paper is to shed light on the following questions: Can educational
quality account for higher education which are essentially an non-mandatory education? And if so,
what are the channels through which educational quality operates? And how educational quality
may a⁄ect the long run income level?
To answer these questions, we present a model of schooling decisions where growth results from
the accumulation of physical and human capital. We ￿nd a simple closed-form solution, which
allows us to identify the mechanisms at work and thus provides a theoretical foundation to check
the results empirically. Our theory is based on the following assumptions. First, we di⁄erentiate
between primary and higher education in a simple way: every individual is assumed to have the
elementary skills which are taught in primary school, but there is an opportunity to continue on in
education, which is a private choice. Speci￿cally, higher education requires investment of private
resources. Agents decide whether or not to pursue higher education, and if so, how much to spend
on it. Accordingly, our focus is on the evolution of secondary education, under the assumption that
the goal of universal basic literacy has already been met. Second, we assume the quality of the
educational system to be an exogenous variable and, motivated by the evidence of Hanushek and
Woessmann (2008), it a⁄ects the returns on education. Finally, agents are heterogeneous in two
dimensions; ability and inherited wealth, but capital markets are perfect. The essential implication
of this assumption is that schooling decisions are independent of the current distribution of wealth
levels. Although capital markets for education are far from perfect in reality, this assumption allows
us to isolate and best illustrate the role played by education quality.4
Our proposed theoretical model makes several predictions. It identi￿es two potential channels
by which the quality of the educational system a⁄ects human capital accumulation. On the one
hand, low educational quality decreases the returns from education and discourages access to higher
education across a broader segment of the population. As a result, low quality could act as a barrier to
pursuing higher education. We refer to this e⁄ect as the extensive channel. On the other hand, once
individuals participate in higher education, high-quality educational systems raise the investments
4Adding imperfections in the capital markets would reinforce our results.
























































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80


























































in schooling made by each person beyond primary school. We call this the intensive channel.
Apart from educational quality, general equilibrium forces also impact schooling choices through
changes in prices, reinforcing the e⁄ects of quality on schooling attainment. We show that as output
per capita increases, agents have more incentives to invest in higher education. Greater per capita
GDP a⁄ects the returns as well as the cost of education, since as wages increase, the marginal returns
on education rise, while its opportunity cost ￿ given by the interest rate￿ falls.
Educational quality allows for di⁄erent steps of development because the extensive and the
intensive channels are not acting always with the same strength over the course of a country￿ s devel-
opment. At low levels of educational quality, the extensive channel is at work, and here individuals
would optimally decide to remain with primary education and only to invest in physical capital. As
a result, aggregate output is low. This stage of development is called Regime I. As capital accumu-
lates, and due to the general equilibrium e⁄ect, the economy could enter into Regime II, in which
only the more intelligent agents invest in higher education. However, for agents with low abilities,
the educational quality constraint remains binding and they stay with primary education instead.
Along this transition from Regime I to Regime II, the output per capita is pushed onto a higher
dynamic path. Economic growth increases the returns from investing in higher education relative
to physical capital, raising the opportunities to pursue education beyond the primary level for less
talented individuals, so that the economy enters Regime III. At this last stage of development, only
the intensive channel is at work and the higher the quality, the larger the investment in higher
education. Here, everyone makes the optimal investment, and the current gross interest rate equals
the expected marginal product of higher education for each ability type. As a result, the economy
is at the maximum possible income level in the steady state.
4The level of educational quality determines the long-run income level, and depending on quality
the economy may follow di⁄erent paths. In one extreme, when quality is relatively high, the economy
gradually develop towards the maximum possible income level in the steady state, with the full
population investing in higher education. In the other extreme, when education quality is relatively
low, the economy will ￿nd itself in a sort of poverty trap with no one going to secondary schooling.
The predictions of the model are tested on a broad sample of countries. Our measures of the
quality of education refer to students￿cognitive performance in various international tests of aca-
demic achievement in math and science, taken from Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009) and Barro and Lee (2001). We measure university quality through international
rankings that indicate universities￿academic performance, taken from the Shanghai Jiao Tong Uni-
versity Academic Ranking of World Universities.
There has been considerable recent research seeking to quantify the role of educational quality as
an important determinant of cross-country income di⁄erences (see e.g., Erosa et al. 2006, Manuelli
and Seshardri 2007, Schoellman 2009, and Cordoba and Ripoll 2007).5 However, our paper con-
centrates on the e⁄ect of education quality on the process of development. Therefore, this paper
analyses the dynamic relationship between educational quality, the distribution of educational at-
tainments and economic growth. Surprisingly, there is a continuing lack of papers addressing this
issue and we contribute to this literature in several aspects.6 On the theoretical side, ￿rst no study so
far has analyzed how educational quality a⁄ects schooling decisions regarding higher education. We
show that, due to the extensive channel, educational quality could become a barrier to investments
beyond primary levels. Consequently, we complement the literature of multiplicity of equilibria by
providing an alternative theory generating this type of results.7 Second, our work focuses on human
capital composition by di⁄erentiating between primary and higher education, which in turn a⁄ects
the process of development.8 On the empirical side, the predictions of our theory are tested on
5Erosa et al. (2006) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2007) follow a similar approach and estimate the parameters of
the production function of the human capital stock of a country that includes both time and goods inputs. The two
variables, quantity and quality of the educational system, are decided at the individual level, and educational quality
is captured by the total aggregate spending on education. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that increasing the
amount of resources spent does not always translate into better learning among students (see, e.g., Hanushek, 1995;
You, 2008). This issue motivates the inclusion of educational quality as a parameter that varies across countries and
is exogenous to the individuals deciding about higher education.
6Tamura￿ s (2001) theoretical analysis was one of the ￿rst to include teacher quality in the production function of
human capital in order to study the importance of teacher quality versus class size for growth.
7For theoretical literature dealing with the impact of human capital investments under credit market restrictions
and multiple steady states and poverty traps, see Galor and Zeira (1993), Mookherjee and Ray (2003) and Mookherjee
and Napel (2006) among others. In contrast to these, Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2009) shows that when credit market
imperfections are endogenized, poverty traps may be avoided and intergenerational mobility may increase. Other
papers that obtain multiple equilibria without assuming credit market restrictions include Galor and Tsiddon (1997),
Moav (2002), or Castell￿-Climent and DomØnech (2008).
8In Manuelli and Seshadri (2007) human capital accumulaltion di⁄ers between early childhood and subsequent
schooling. Erosa et al. (2006) distinguish cross-sectional heterogeneity in schooling in US data to restrict the para-
meters of the time share and returns to scale of the human capital production function. Nevertheless, their objective,
which is di⁄erent from us, is to explain income di⁄erences across country through cross-country human capital di⁄er-
ences.
5a broad sample of countries using regression analysis rather natural experiments and retrospective
analysis in a particular country (see e.g., Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Case and Deaton, 1999; Du￿ o,
2001; Hanushek et al., 2008). As far as we know, we are the ￿rst to take a macroeconomic perspec-
tive by testing the e⁄ect of the quality of schooling on primary, secondary and tertiary schooling,
and by using aggregate data on several countries at di⁄erent stages of development to examine
whether increases in the quality and quantity of education have the same e⁄ect at the initial levels
of development as they do at later stages.9 Whereas Hanushek and Kimko (2000) were the ￿rst to
highlight the importance of the quality of education in promoting economic growth rates, the analy-
sis in this paper goes one step further by testing some predictions of the model. On the one hand,
the results show that quality does not a⁄ect economic growth in countries at the bottom end of the
quality distribution, yet better educational quality has a clear positive in￿ uence on economic growth
in the remaining economies. On the other hand, although both quality and investment in higher
education are important determinants of economic growth in developing countries, our result show
a predominant e⁄ect of quality of education over investment rates in more developed economies.
In addition, we also ￿nd that the proposed channels through which educational quality a⁄ects
secondary and tertiary education are quantitatively important. In particular, our results reveal a
statistically signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of educational quality on attainment levels in secondary and
tertiary education. Moreover, when controlling for the stock of human capital, countries with better
educational quality are those with higher enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education as well.
Furthermore, consistent with the fact that primary education is publicly provided and compulsory
in most parts of the world, the e⁄ect of educational quality barely in￿ uences primary schooling. We
show these results are not due to omitted variable bias, they hold when controlling for the initial
level of development, a measure of current ￿nancial development, years of compulsory education, and
several time-invariant variables that re￿ ect cultural, geographical, and institutional characteristics
of each country. Results are also robust against outliers and are unlikely to be driven by reverse
causation. In addition to analyzing the e⁄ect that the lagged value of the quality of schooling has
on the future decisions to invest in higher education, we also correct for potential endogeneity bias
by using instrumental variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model under partial equilibrium. Section
3 analyses the economy in a general equilibrium context. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
empirically analyzes the channels through which quality in￿ uences the quantity of schooling. Section
6 examines the link between education and growth, and Section 7 states the conclusions reached.
2 The Model
We study a model in which growth dynamics result from physical capital accumulation as well as from
human capital accumulation in a context where the quality of the educational system is exogenous.
9Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2009, 2010) analyze from a macroeconomic
perspective the in￿uence of the quality of education on the growth rates. For a detail analysis of these papers see
Section 7.2.
6Our economy consists of one sequence of overlapping generations that live for two periods. Agents
have primary education which is compulsory and also have the opportunity to invest in higher
education by spending private resources, and there is a perfect capital market for human capital
accumulation. In the second period, agents work and earn an income consistent with their human
capital investment.
2.1 Production
In every period, the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption






where Kt, Ht are quantities of physical and human capital (measured in e¢ ciency units) and em-
ployed in production at time t; kt is the capital-labor ratio and ￿ 2 (0;1). The production function
is strictly monotone increasing, strictly concave and satis￿es the neoclassical boundary conditions
that assure the existence of an interior solution to the producers￿pro￿t-maximization problem.10
Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per e¢ ciency
unit of labor, and the rate of return to capital, in period t producers choose the level of employment
of capital Kt and the e¢ ciency units of labor Ht so as to maximize pro￿ts. The producers￿inverse
demand for factors of production is therefore given by
rt = f0(kt) = ￿k
￿￿1
t ; (2)
wt = f(kt) ￿ f0(kt)kt = (1 ￿ ￿)k￿
t ;
where rt is the rate of return to capital and wt is the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor. For
simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates fully, ￿ = 1 and thus Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿ = rt+1:
2.2 Individuals
In every period a generation, consisting of a continuum of individuals of measure 1; is born. Each
individual has a single parent and a single child. Agents are identical in preferences, within as well
as across generations, but they di⁄er in inherited wealth as well as in abilities. We denote ability
type as aj with j = H;L and agents can be of a high ability type aH; which occurs with probability
￿ or of a low ability aL type, with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
Agents live for two periods. In the ￿rst period of their lives, individuals devote their entire
time to the acquisition of human capital, while in the second periods agents supply their e¢ cient
units of education. Primary education is compulsory so that every individual is assumed to have the
elementary skills which are taught in primary school.11 Higher education requires private investments
in education instead. Thus, in the ￿rst period of their lives, agents make decisions on whether or
10For models where growth is given by physical and human capital accumulation and educational attainment increase
with income, see Galor and Moav (2004) and Galor et al. (2008).
11Introducing a tax to ￿nance primary schooling does not change the results qualitatively.
7not to acquire higher education, so that even in the absence of expenditures, all individuals acquire
primary education. Accordingly, our focus is on the evolution of secondary education, under the
assumption that the goal of universal basic literacy has already been met.
In the second period of their lives (adulthood), individuals supply their e¢ ciency units of labor
and allocate the resulting wage income, along with their inheritance and capital income, between
consumption ci
t+1 and bequest to their children, bi
t+1 where the upper index i refers to the individual.
The preferences of individual i are given by12,
ui
t = (1 ￿ ￿)lnci
t+1 + ￿ lnbi
t+1;





Notice that by using FOC, a ￿xed fraction ￿ of total income is saved bi￿
t+1 = ￿yi
t+1 and the
remaining income is consumed ci￿
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)yi
t+1; such that the indirect utility function can be
written as
Ui
t = ln(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿￿
￿yi
t+1:
2.3 Formation of human capital
If agents choose to invest in higher education, they need to decide what level of private expenditures
to make, which in our model is given by It. Alternatively, we can introduce investment in time spent
on schooling in the production function of human capital. We have chosen the ￿rst formulation to
stress that even with perfect capital markets, educational quality may play a crucial role in schooling
decisions.13 The production function for higher education is
h
high
t+1;j = ￿aj￿(1 + ￿It)￿ with j = H;L and ￿ < 1; (3)
The human capital production function also depends on the quality of the educational system, which
is exogenous and measured by ￿; and on the level of ability aj. When It = 0; the acquired level
of human capital is primary schooling, h
pri
t+1;j = ￿aj￿ with ￿ being an exogenous investment made
by the government. Although the marginal returns to investment in higher schooling diminishes
with the real resources invested, rising school quality shifts the marginal returns upward over all
educational levels.14 Talented individuals have higher total returns and marginal returns on higher
education than less talented ones. Notice that the marginal returns to quality in equation 3 are
12This "joy-of-giving" altruism is the common form discussed in the literature on income distribution. It is supported
empirically by Altoniji et al. (1997).
13If time were the input in the production of human capital, the qualitative results would not be a⁄ected, as long
as the time invested in the formation of human capital increases with the capital labor ratio.
14Some studies provide evidence on the impact of test performance on earnings, using nationally representative
datasets for the US (e.g., Mulligan 1999, Murnane et al. 2000, Lazear 2003). Even controlling for the quantity
of schooling, the experience of workers and other factors that can in￿uence earnings, these studies ￿nd that higher
quality ￿ as measured by cognitive test scores￿ has a clear impact on earnings. See Hanushek and Woessman (2008)
for an overview of this literature.
8increasing. Entering in this way is important to be consistent with the empirical evidence showing
us that quality a⁄ects educations decisions ￿for example ￿gure 1.
Notice that the production function of secondary and tertiary education is given by equation (3).
Due to this simple set up, di⁄erences between these two levels of schooling are due to di⁄erences in
the investments in education, such that the higher It; the higher the schooling level attained, and
thus the quantity of higher education per person.15
The aggregate stock of e¢ ciency units of human capital will be the sum of primary and higher
levels of education.
2.4 Investment decisions
We assume that capital markets are perfect. While this assumption is far from reality, we assume
it to emphasize the role of the quality of the educational system. The main implication of this
assumption is that when agents decide to invest beyond primary education, everybody makes the
optimal investment to maximize expected income irrespective of one￿ s initial wealth. Consequently,
the allocation of productive capital between agents is independent of the current distribution of
wealth levels, and what really matters is aggregate wealth.
In the presence of the log utility function and perfect capital markets, e¢ cient human capital
accumulation decisions are those that maximize the lifetime income of the individual. Therefore when
agents decide whether or not to invest in higher education, they solve the following maximization




t+1;j ￿ Rt+1(It ￿ bi
t):
The optimal interior solution, It; equates the marginal return to physical capital and human
capital,
wt+1￿
2￿(1 + ￿It)￿￿1aj = Rt+1: (4)
This FOC tells us that the optimal investment is given when the opportunity cost of investing in









Since the quality of the educational system positively a⁄ects the returns on education, education
quality is a force that increases investment. We call this e⁄ect the intensive channel; the larger
the quality, the larger the investment made per person. In the next sections, we will show that
this e⁄ect is reinforce under general equilibrium, and that the date is in favor of this channel. The
optimal level of higher education is increasing with ability and talented individuals choose longer
schooling periods. Indeed, consistent with empirical evidence, a positive relationship exists between
cognitive ability and college attendance for all family income and wealth levels in both the NLSY79
15Using data from Education at a Glance (2009), the correlations between public and private expenditures on
secondary and tertiary educational institutions as a percentage of GDP in the year 1995 and enrollment rates in
secondary and tertiary education are 0,516 and 0,575, respectively.
9and NLSY97 (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2002, and Belley and Lochner, 2007). As expected, the
optimal investment is increasing with the wage rate, decreasing with the opportunity cost of the





@Ij < 1; we can ￿nd a ￿ low enough such that the FOC becomes wt+1￿
2￿aj￿ <
Rt+1 and individuals optimally remains with primary, I￿
t;aj = 0: Let￿ s de￿ne the threshold level of
educational quality in which agents are indi⁄erent between investing in higher education or not










This equation identi￿es what we call the extensive channel of educational quality on decisions
to access higher education. It states that only when quality is above a threshold, individuals enter
higher schooling. By contrast when quality is below it, educational quality becomes a barrier to
enter higher schooling. In the next sections, we will check if there is evidence in support of this
channel.
This threshold depends on individuals, not through inherited wealth since capital markets are
perfect, but through di⁄erences in ability. In particular, it decreases with ability since talented
agents have more incentives to invest in higher education. It is increasing in the opportunity cost
of higher education Rt+1; so that an increase in the interest rate tightens the constraints on higher
investment. If the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor increases, the constraint on education loosens
since with higher wages the returns on investments in higher education are higher as well.
The next proposition summarizes the optimal educational investment decisions under partial
equilibrium. It states that education quality is a crucial variable in determining educational choices
and thus human capital composition.
Proposition 1 [Human capital composition and the extensive channel]. For a given level of wt+1;
Rt+1;Yt and ￿ the composition of human capital depends on the quality of the school system in the
following way.
Regime I) If e ￿aH > ￿ holds, that is when the quality is relatively low, all agents receive primary
education.
Regime II) If e ￿aL > ￿ ￿ e ￿aH holds, only talented agents invest in higher education, while low
ability agents get primary schooling.
Regime III) If ￿ ￿ e ￿aL holds, that is when the quality is high enough, all agents invest in higher
education.
Proof. It follows from the maximization problem of the individual described above.
3 General Equilibrium
Up to now, we have analyzed partial equilibrium, showing that educational quality becomes crucial
explaining the composition of human capital. This is so because ￿rst, educational quality below a
threshold would imply that some agents would prefer to remain with primary education￿ extensive
channel￿ , and second better educational quality implies a larger level of investment in higher school-
10ing per person ￿ intensive channel. We will show that in general equilibrium, both results are rein-
forced since as the economy develops, higher output would entail a change in prices that provides
incentives for agents to invest in higher education.
3.1 The economy￿ s output accumulation path
In this section, we ￿rst analyze the threshold level of educational quality under general equilibrium,
which distinguish the di⁄erent stages of development. And second, we show that in every period
the economy, as an aggregate, is entirely characterized by the aggregate output per worker or per
capita, Yt: Finally, we study its law of motion at each stage and along the process of development in
order to understand the dynamics implications of the model for the composition of human capital,
output and educational quality.
Let￿ s ￿nd the analytical solution under general equilibrium of the lower bound of the threshold
of quality￿that is e ￿aH;t. By Proposition 1, we know that if quality is relatively low, i.e. ￿ < e ￿aH;t
holds, all agents receive primary education and the aggregate capital stock at t + 1 is as follows:
Kt+1 = Bt = ￿Yt;
Since capital depreciates at rate ￿ = 1; the aggregate capital stock at t + 1 comes from aggregate




t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)h
i;pr
t+1:





with a = ￿aH + (1 ￿ ￿)aL being the average ability, and kt+1 being increasing in Yt and decreasing
in ￿: Taking into account this capital-labor ratio and equations (2) and (6), the threshold level of





The upper bound of the threshold of quality is given by e ￿aL: If ￿ > e ￿aL holds, all agents invest
in higher education and thus, the aggregate capital stock is given by
Kt+1 = ￿Yt ￿ ￿I￿
t;aH ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I￿
t;aL:
The aggregate stock of human capital is
Ht+1 = ￿h
high
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)h
high
t+1 = ￿￿aL￿(1 + I￿
t;aL)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿:
Since I￿
t;aj is strictly increasing in kt+1 (see equation 2 and 5), after some calculation the capital-labor






￿ ￿)[1 + ￿
(1￿￿)￿]1￿￿ = kIII(Yt;￿); (8)
11with e a = ￿a
1
1￿￿
L + (1 ￿ ￿)a
1
1￿￿
H and kt+1 being increasing in Yt and decreasing in ￿:16 Considering
this capital-labor ratio and equations (3) and (6), the threshold level of education quality for low
ability agents is
e ￿aL;t =







L ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
: (9)
For a given Yt; e ￿aH;t < e ￿aL;t holds17. The thresholds level of education quality varies systematically
with the level of development. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the extensive channel as a function
of per capita output. In particular, it is decreasing with Yt since as output per capita increases, the
equilibrium prices change because the interest rate decreases and wages increases. As a result, the
constraints on quality are relaxed as the economy develops.
[Insert Figure 2]:
We can de￿ne the threshold level of per capita output e Yaj(￿) = (e ￿aj)￿1. From Figure 2, we need
to consider the three following cases: a) Regime I: ￿ ￿ e ￿aH;t < e ￿aL;t(or similarly Yt ￿ e YaH < e YaL),
with all agents with primary education, b) Regime II: e ￿aH;t < ￿ < e ￿aL;t (that is, e YaH < Yt < e YaL),
with only talented individuals with higher education and c) Regime III: e ￿aH;t < e ￿aL;t ￿ ￿ (or
similarly e YaH < e YaL ￿ Yt); where all agents have higher education.
Under Regime I) If ￿ < e ￿aH;t; the aggregate output per capita is given by
Yt+1 = (￿Yt)￿(￿a￿)1￿￿: (10)
with Yt+1 = Y I(Yt;￿).
Under Regime II) e ￿aH;t < ￿ < e ￿aL;t;only talented individuals invest in higher education. The
aggregate stock of physical capital is,
Kt+1 = ￿Yt ￿ ￿I￿
t;aH
We add across people using the population share in each schooling category to obtain an aggregate
measure of human capital
Ht+1 = ￿h
pri
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)h
high
t+1 = ￿￿aL￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿:




￿￿aL￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿:
Notice that I￿
t;aj is strictly increasing in kt+1. This equation implicitly de￿ne kt+1 = kII(Yt; ￿): It
is easy to check that @kt+1=@￿ < 0; @kt+1=@Yt > 0:
16We need 1 > " + ￿ for kt+1 be increasing with Yt:
17This is so, because a





> 1 always hold.
12The aggregate output per capita is given by
Yt+1 = (￿Yt ￿ ￿I￿
t;aH)￿(￿￿aL￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿)1￿￿: (11)
with Yt+1 = Y II(Yt;￿):
Under Regime III) e ￿aH;t < e ￿aL;t ￿ ￿; the aggregate output per capita is given by
Yt+1 = (￿Yt ￿ ￿I￿
t;aL ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I￿
t;aH)￿(￿￿aL￿(1 + I￿
t;aL)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿)1￿￿ (12)
with Yt+1 = Y III(Yt;￿):





Y III(Yt;￿) if e YaL ￿ Yt or e ￿aL;t ￿ ￿
Y II(Yt;￿) if e YaH ￿ Yt < e YaL or e ￿aH;t ￿ ￿ < e ￿aL;t
Y I(Yt;￿) if Yt < e YaH or ￿ < e ￿aH;t
(13)
In the next section, we discuss the most interesting equilibrium dynamics paths.
3.2 The dynamics of output per worker
The dynamic path of output per worker is not unique since it will depend upon the initial output per
worker, Y0, and on how the variables e YaH < e YaL and Y III
ss ; Y II
ss ; Y I
ss are related. Intuitively, because
under Regime III all agents maximize income, output per worker is the highest. Since Regime II is
the mixed regime between Regime I and Regime II, then Y III
t+1 = Y II
t+1 = Y I
t+1 holds at any t. From
the analysis above, we know that Y III
ss > Y II
ss > Y I
ss and that e YaH < e YaL holds.
[Insert Figure 3]
Let us consider the following order of the parameters:
A. e YaL < Y I
ss:
The dynamics of output per capita is depicted in ￿gure 3. We assume that the initial output
per worker Y0 is below the value e YaH; such that the economy is in Regime I, characterized by a
low level of aggregate output. At this stage of development, agents optimally attend only primary
education. As output per worker increases, due to physical capital accumulation, the threshold level
of educational quality decreases, and thus, it becomes feasible for high ability agents to invest in
secondary education. Consequently, the economy is entering Regime II where less talented individuals
remain with primary education and others progress to higher schooling levels. Along this transition
the output per capita is pushed up to a higher dynamic path. Higher output increases the returns
from investment in education while its cost gets reduced, such that low ability agents reallocate their
resources toward investments in higher education. As a result, the economy achieves the last stage
of development, Regime III, where all its agents make the ￿rst-best investment in higher levels of
schooling. Once the economy reaches Regime III and all agents are investing the optimal amount in
higher education, it will remain in this regime thereafter. It is worth noting that at this last stage of
13development, the amount invested in higher education per agent is higher than in Regime II. This is
because higher output increases the investment in higher education through the general equilibrium
price e⁄ect. As a result, we could interpret the investment in higher education in Regime II as
secondary education, and the one in Regime III as tertiary education.
In summary, Figure 3 shows us the interdependence among economic growth, the distribution
of educational attainment, and the quality of the educational system. As we move along the three
development paths, output per worker increases, which in turn, due to general equilibrium e⁄ects,
increases the future capital-labor ratio changing the equilibrium prices. Speci￿cally, larger output
per worker increases the wage per e¢ cient unit and decreases the interest rate￿ see equation 2￿so
that agents get incentives to invest in higher education. Consequently, as output increases, more
people could enter into higher schooling ￿ the constraint on quality relaxed (see ￿gure 2)￿and, once
agents decided to invest in higher education, the investment per person also increases. Both e⁄ects,
due to the general equilibrium price changes, en up fostering the accumulation of human capital.
The next proposition summarizes the equilibirum and some of its properties.
Proposition 2: If the aggregate output per worker is given by the law of motion in equation
(11) and if e YaL < Y I
ss holds, Y III
ss is the unique and locally stable equilibrium. Moreover, it is the
highest possible steady state.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, because under Regime III all agents maximize income, output per worker is maximized.
The implication of the proposition above is the following corollary.
Corollary 1. [Comparative statics of educational quality on aggregate output per capita]. An
increase in educational quality moves the path of output per worker upwards under Regime III solely
through the direct e⁄ect of quality on the human capital production function, and not through the
indirect e⁄ect of quality on the investment in higher education.
Countries like South Korea, or Taiwan in the 40￿ s were doing enormous initial investment in
education to implement its strong educational reforms, and both countries move to a higher steady
state.
B. Y I
ss < e YaH < Y II
ss < e YaL < Y III
ss
We assume that the initial output per worker Y0 is below the value Y I
ss: Since Y I
ss < e YaH holds,
the economy converges to the low stable steady state Y I
ss; where agents only have primary education.
For any level of output between the thresholds e YaH and e YaL; the economy converge to Y II
ss . And
for any level of output above e YaL the economy converges to the highest stable steady state under
Regime III, Y III
ss :
It is interesting to analyze the conditions under which the country can be stuck at the low steady
state where agents only have primary education. This may occur when the marginal propensity
to save is low, since Y I
ss is increasing with ￿ and e YaH is decreasing instead. In our model more
education is given by transforming physical capital into human capital. Therefore, economies with
a low savings rate will accumulate less physical capital, and thus per capita output at a lower rate.
Similarly, when ￿ is very low, it could trap the economy at a low level of development since with an
initially very low quality of the educational system, the extensive channel becomes e⁄ective, so that
14e YaH will be relatively high and Y I
ss will be relatively low.
In short, this paper suggests that low educational quality could adversely a⁄ect a country￿ s
process of development through the extensive and the intensive channels. In the following, we will
text empirically whether educational quality a⁄ects the growth process.
4 Data
The predictions of our theoretical model regarding the in￿ uence of schooling quality on the quantity
invested in education and its in￿ uence on the process of development are analyzed empirically for a
broad sample of countries. One of the main drawbacks in this regard is that quality of schooling is
di¢ cult to measure, and data on educational quality across countries is scarce. The existing data on
educational quality for a broad sample of countries comes from two main sources. The ￿rst includes
measures of schooling inputs, such as expenditures per student, teacher-pupil ratio, and teachers·
salaries, among others. The second refers to direct measures of output or cognitive skills. In this
paper, we use the second since it directly measures the knowledge acquired while in school. In
fact, several papers conclude that more resources spent in school do not always improve students￿
performance (see, e.g., Hanushek, 1995).
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) is the ￿rst attempt to compile measures of quality of schooling
across countries based on students￿cognitive performance in various international tests of academic
achievement in math and science. Originally, only 39 countries participated in international tests
of academic achievement. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) extended these original measures to other
countries by imputing missing values from international test score regressions. By combining all
available information, these authors computed a single measure for 90 countries averaged over the
period 1960-1991.18
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) extend previous measures to improve direct comparisons of
student knowledge over time, across tests and across age groups.19 The new data set provides
measures of test scores for 77 countries as an average over the period 1964-2003. However, in spite
of its improvement in comparability terms and the e⁄ort to include more countries, for many of the
new countries there are not data on per capita GDP for the period 1960-2004 (e.g. the new data set
includes 15 former communist countries). As a result, when combined Hanushek and Woessmann￿ s
(2009) data with other data sets the number of observations in the sample is highly reduced.
We also use Barro and Lee￿ s (2001) data set, which compiles scores on the examinations in science,
mathematics, and reading for students of di⁄erent age groups in various years in 58 countries. In
particular, we use data of 13-14 year-old students￿test scores in math and science available for the
years 1964, 1982-1983, 1988, 1990-1991, and 1993-1998 for the math test, and for the years 1970-
1972, 1984, 1988, 1990-1991, and 1993-1998 for the science test. The use of math and science and
not the reading scores is derived from the idea that research activities and the creation of new ideas
are important sources of growth (e.g., Romer, 1990).
18Throughout the paper we use the quality variable QL2 taken from Table C-1 in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
19Tests are performed mainly in students at the secondary level of education, usually from age 9 to age 15.
15While the aforementioned measures refer to students who are likely to be attending secondary
education, there are no similar data available across countries for older students of university age.
As an alternative, we measure university quality through international ranking that indicate uni-
versities￿academic performance. The Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking of World
Universities (the Shanghai ranking) aggregates six di⁄erent indicators of research performance at
the university level, such as alumni and sta⁄ winning Nobel Prizes, highly cited researchers, and
articles indexed in major citation indices.20 The resulting academic rankings of the top 500 insti-
tutions are available annually since 2003. Although the weights used to compute the rankings are
somewhat arbitrary, one of the advantages of the indexes is that they are computed from publicly
available information. However, the main drawback is that they do not take into account countries￿
population and, therefore, they do not correct for a possible scale e⁄ect. To solve this problem, we
use the methodology suggested by Aghion et al. (2007, 2009), which transforms the original index
into a measure that can be interpreted as a fraction of the United States per capita performance.21
We report the results using the transformed index of the top 100 and top 500 institutions.
Data on the quantity of education is taken from two di⁄erent sources. As a measure of the stock
of human capital, we use the share of individuals with a given level of schooling, proxied by data on
the share of population aged 25 and above for whom primary, secondary, and tertiary is the highest
level of school attained. The source is the latest Barro and Lee￿ s (2010) data set available from
1950 to 2010. The investment in education is proxied by enrollment rates in primary, secondary, and
tertiary education, taken from Barro and Lee (1994) and updated with UNESCO data. The time
span for enrollment rates is from 1960 to 2008.
To avoid the results to be biased by omitted variables, we control for an array of measures that
could in￿ uence the decisions of individuals to invest in higher education as well as other variables
that are related to both the quantity and quality of schooling. Next we de￿ne the additional controls
and in the next section we discuss in detail why these variables should be included in the analysis.
We control for the degree of credit market imperfection. Due to the lack of data on credit
market constraints for a su¢ cient number of countries and periods, the literature has commonly
used ￿nancial development as a proxy for credit constraints (see, e.g., Flug et al. 1998, Iyigun
and Owen 2004). Following this literature, we also measure credit market restrictions through the
variable (FD), which equals the private credit provided by deposit money banks, divided by GDP.
The variable is taken from the latest version of the Financial Development and Structure Database by
Beck and Demirg￿￿-Kunt (2009). Although the variable of ￿nancial development does not measure
20The indicators of research performance include the number of alumni from the university winning Nobel Prizes
in physics, chemistry, medicine, and economics, and Fields Medals in mathematics; the number of university faculty
winning Nobel Prizes in the same ￿elds; the number of articles (co-) authored by university faculty published in
Nature and Science; the number of articles (co-) authored by university faculty published in the Science Citation
Index Expanded and the Social Science Citation Index; the number of highly cited researchers from the university in
21 broad subject categories, and the academic performance with respect to the size of the university.
21For example, to compute the measure of Top 100, Aghion et al. (2007) take the best university in the top 100 of
the Shanghai ranking and give it a score of 100, the next best university is given a score of 99, and so on. Then they
compute the sum of the top 100 universities in each country and divide the sum by the country￿ s population. Finally
they compute a relative score compared to the United States by dividing each country score by that of the US.
16the imperfections in credit markets directly, we expect there to be less restriction to access credit
since the ￿nancial system is more developed.
To control for the number of years that are compulsory at the secondary level, we take data on
duration of compulsory education from UNESCO.22 The cultural characteristics are proxied by the
share of the population professing a religion (taken from La Porta et. al 1999), the number of school
days per year (Barro and Lee 2001) and a dummy for East Asian countries. In fact, the high value
people in East Asian countries place on education may explain why these economies score high on
international tests and have higher levels of schooling than other countries with similar levels of
development. Political institutions are proxied by a dummy for democratic countries, taken from
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). Geographical characteristics are measured with a dummy for
countries located in tropical areas taken from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). Finally, as additional
controls we add public spending on education as a share of GDP, taken from the World Development
Indicators and Barro and Lee (1994), and the share of total population living in urban areas, from
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002).
For the estimation of the growth equation, we use data on real per capita GDP, the physical
capital investment rate, the government share of real GDP, and exports plus imports divided by real
GDP, all taken from the PWT 6.2. Finally, the in￿ ation rate, measured as the annual growth rate
of consumer prices, is taken from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002).
5 Empirical results on the e⁄ect of quality on quantity of
education
5.1 Hypothesis to be tested
5.1.1 Extensive channel [H1]
Proposition 1 shows that only when quality is above a threshold level, individuals decide to invest
in secondary schooling, creating a broader segment of the population with a higher education.
One cross-country implication of this Proposition is that we would expect that in countries where
educational quality is larger, the stock of people with secondary schooling will be larger too. To
check this hypothesis, our empirical strategy would be the following:
Educationi;t = ￿0 + ￿1Qualityh
i;t￿￿ + ￿2 lnyi;t￿￿ (14)
+￿3FDi;t￿￿ + ￿4Y earsCi;t￿￿ + ￿4Xi;t￿￿ + ￿i;t;
where Educationi, t is measured as the share of population 25 years and above with secondary
and tertiary education as the highest level of school attained, i stands for the country and t for the
time. To minimize reverse causation all explanatory variables are lagged ￿ periods. This channel
22The main drawback of the data on years of compulsory education is that they are only available from 2000
onwards.
17states that the higher the quality of education (Qualityh) the higher the number of individuals that
will decide to enter secondary schooling. Hence, we expect ￿1 > 0 and statistically signi￿cant.
In general equilibrium, the investment in higher education is also determined by equilibrium
prices, which in turn depend on the aggregate level of per capita output. Speci￿cally, it increases
with aggregate output per capita. To avoid the coe¢ cient of quality is also picking up the general
equilibrium e⁄ect, we need to control for the initial level of per capita income (lny). We also include
other mechanisms that can in￿ uence the decision to invest in higher education such as the number of
compulsory years in secondary schooling (Y earsC), and the existence of credit market constraints,
proxied by the degree of ￿nancial development (FD). As detailed below, other controls also include
time invariant variables to account for cultural, political and geographical characteristics that may
in￿ uence both the quality and the quantity of education.
5.1.2 Intensive channel [H2]
The model shows that once people decide to enter higher education, the larger the quality the larger






Since the seminal work by Mankiw et al. (1992) it has been common in the empirical literature
to use the secondary school enrollment rate as a proxy for human capital investment. Using this
measure as the dependent variable, we test the intensive margin with the following econometric
speci￿cation:
￿
hi;t = ￿0 + ￿1Qualityh
t￿￿ + ￿2 lnyi;t￿￿ + ￿3Educationi;t￿￿ + ￿i;t (16)
where
￿
h stands for the accumulation of higher education, measured through the enrollment
rates in secondary schooling. As before, the speci￿cation also accounts for the general equilibrium
e⁄ects by including per capita income in the set of controls. Once individuals have decided to
invest in education, a better-quality educational system implies a higher investment in schooling.
Thus, controlling for the initial stock of secondary education (Education), we expect ￿1 > 0 and
statistically signi￿cant.
5.2 Empirical Results
We start by testing H1 and H2 using Hanushek and Kimko￿ s (2000) data set on quality since it
contains a greater number of countries, including several developing economies, as compared to
other available data sets. Nevertheless, in the next subsection we show the results are robust to
alternative measures of educational quality.
In order to correct for potential endogeneity bias we measure the explanatory variables lagged
several years. Speci￿cally, given the variable on educational quality is available as an average over
the period 1964-1991, we split the whole sample into two sub periods and measure the explanatory
variables from 1960 to 1990 and the dependent variable from 1990 to 2010. Table 2 displays the
18results for the extensive margin in columns (1-6) and those for the intensive channel in columns
(7-9).
Controlling for the initial level of development, measured as the log of real GDP per capita
in 1960, the results in column (1) show that a higher-quality educational system has a positive
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the subsequent attainment levels in secondary schooling. The
estimated coe¢ cient suggests that an increase in one standard deviation in the quality indicator
(11.9) increases attainment levels in secondary schooling by 6 percent. This positive and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect of the quality of education on attainment levels in secondary schooling is not the
result of atypical observations. Column (2) includes dummy variables that control for outliers, since
their residuals exceed more than two times the estimated standard error of the residuals.23 The
estimated coe¢ cient of the quality of schooling does not change, which implies that previous results
are not driven by atypical observations. The importance of the quality aspect of education is also
re￿ ected in its explanatory power, since the initial level of development and the quality of schooling
explain about 60 percent of the variation across countries in secondary schooling attainment levels.
Whereas our model suggests that causality goes from quality to quantity of education, it is
possible that a society￿ s level of development and education in￿ uence the resources devoted to schools
and the production of human capital. For example, more developed and educated societies may
demand a higher-quality educational system. Hence, governments cannot directly a⁄ect outcomes,
but they can increase the resources spent on education or promote policies that improve the quality
of schooling. For example, governments may respond to these demands by providing more computers
and schooling materials, by increasing the number of teachers, by increasing teachers￿salaries, etc.
Thus, column (3) controls for the share of public spending on education, which comprises all of the
aforementioned items.
On the other hand, since access to school may be easier in urban areas than in rural ones, we also
control for the share of population living in urban areas. Moreover, access to skilled jobs is lower and
prospects for the future less favorable in rural areas, which may also discourage individuals living
in these areas from making investments in higher education. Results show that higher spending on
education and a greater share of population living in urban areas are related to higher attainment
levels in secondary education. However, even when controlling for any of these variables, the positive,
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of educational quality on attainment levels in secondary schooling still
holds.24
It may also be possible that countries with a higher-quality educational system are also those in
which governments ascribe high importance to education. Thus, it could be that instead of quality,
we are picking up the higher number of years of compulsory secondary education in these countries.
To rule out this possibility, in column (4) we control for the number of years of education that are
compulsory at the secondary level. The estimated coe¢ cient of this variable is positive, although
23Countries whose residuals exceed more than two times the estimated standard error of the residuals include Ghana
and Sri Lanka, with a positive value and New Zealand with a negative one.
24Results do not change if we control for other inputs determined by the government that directly a⁄ect secondary
schooling, such as the pupil-teacher ratio in secondary school and the share of government educational expenditures
per pupil at the secondary level, taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
19not statistically signi￿cant at the standard levels. Nevertheless, our results show that controlling for
this variable does not change the coe¢ cient and signi￿cance of the measure of quality of schooling.
Results do not change either if we control for a proxy of restrictions in the credit market, which
has been the channel analyzed most frequently in the literature to explain underinvestments in
education. Thus, column (5) controls for private credit provided by deposit money banks as a share
of GDP. Results show that economies with a better ￿nancial system also have higher attainment
levels in secondary education. However, controlling for a proxy of credit constraints does not change
the positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient of the quality of schooling.
Finally, we directly control for speci￿c characteristics of countries, such as cultural, political, and
geographical factors that may in￿ uence the quality and quantity of schooling. In fact, cultural and
religious features may a⁄ect individuals￿values and attitudes towards education. For example, Guiso
et al. (2003) ￿nd that religious beliefs are associated with economic attitudes. Thus, to eliminate
the possibility that the coe¢ cient of quality of schooling is picking up an East Asian e⁄ect, since
these countries perform well in international tests and have high attainment levels, and to control
for countries￿cultural characteristics, we include in the set of controls an East Asian dummy and
the share of population professing Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant religious beliefs. In addition,
cultural values are also taken into account through the number of school days per year in primary
school, since this can re￿ ect the importance society ascribes to education.25
Furthermore, political institutions and geographical characteristics are controlled for through
a dummy for democratic countries and a dummy for countries in tropical regions.26 Our results
￿ displayed in column (6)￿ show that Muslim countries, on average, have lower attainment lev-
els than countries in which the majority of the population profess a di⁄erent religion. Our results
also show that whereas democratic countries have a larger share of the population with secondary
schooling, being located in tropical areas seems to discourage educational attainment. Nevertheless,
controlling for all of these speci￿c country characteristics does not change the positive and statis-
tically signi￿cant e⁄ect that the quality of education has on the number of individuals who attain
higher levels of education; the coe¢ cient of the quality of education continues to be positive and
statistically signi￿cant.
Overall, our results show a quite robust and positive e⁄ect of the quality of education on the
subsequent proportion of the population with secondary schooling. Next, we show that, given a
stock of education, higher quality increases the investment rates in higher education as well.
The intensive margin is tested in columns (7-9), where the educational investment rates are
proxied through enrollment rates in secondary schooling. Column (7) shows that countries with
higher-quality educational systems also have higher enrollment rates in secondary education. Specif-
ically, an increase of one standard deviation in the quality of education (11.9) is related to an annual
increase of 0.08 points in enrollment rates. Likewise, countries with higher per capita income in
25This variable, taken from Barro and Lee (2001), is not available for higher levels of schooling. A more informative
variable might be the number of school hours per year. However, information on this measure is only restricted to a
small number of countries.
26Sachs and Warner (1997) ￿nd that being located in tropical areas is a geographical disadvantage for development.
201960 also have higher average enrollment rates over the period 1990-2010. Furthermore, as shown
in column (8), the positive in￿ uence of the quality of schooling on enrollment rates in secondary
education is not driven by atypical observations.27
Once individuals decide to invest in higher education, whether or not a higher-quality educational
system implies higher investment in education is tested in column (9). Speci￿cally, the attainment
levels in secondary schooling are included in the set of controls. The ￿ndings reveal that even when
controlling for the stock of human capital, a higher-quality educational system is associated with
higher investment rates in secondary schooling; the coe¢ cient of the quality indicator is positive and
statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.
5.3 Robustness of the results
5.3.1 Alternative measures of the quality of education
We test the robustness of the previous results with alternative measures of quality compiled by
Barro and Lee (2001). The advantage of this data set is that it includes observations of test scores
for di⁄erent years, which allows us to include explanatory variables lagged ￿ve years to minimize
endogeneity concerns. However, this comes at the cost of reducing the number of countries by almost
half.28 Broadly, using Barro and Lee￿ s (2001) data set produces similar results to those found for a
broader set of countries with cross-sectional data. The upper part of Table 3 shows the estimated
coe¢ cient of the quality of education in each speci￿cation is similar to that obtained with Hanushek
and Kimko￿ s data. Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cient of quality is statistically signi￿cant in almost
all speci￿cations.
Results also hold with the measure of quality updated by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009),
which is a clear improvement in terms of comparability over time, across tests and across students
age group. However, when combined with the other data sets the number of observations when
using this measure reduces to only 45 economies. The results, displayed in panel B, show that the
previous ￿ndings using Hanushek and Kimko·s data are not a product of measurement error bias.
The use of the improved data set that ensures a better comparability across countries also shows a
clear positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of a better quality of education on the share of individuals with
secondary schooling. Likewise, once controlling for the stock of secondary education, higher quality
also boosts the investment rates in education, as re￿ ected by the higher enrollment rates.
However, since the data on quality of Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) is computed as an
average up to the year 2003, it is more di¢ cult to control for endogeneity in this scenario. In line
with Pritchett (2000) and Krueger and Lindalh (2001), who use Nerhu et al (1995) and Kyriacou￿ s
(1991) schooling data, respectively, as an instrument for Barro and Lee￿ s (2003) measures on years
of schooling, at the bottom part of Table 3 we follow an instrumental variable approach an use the
27Countries whose residuals exceed more than two times the estimated standard error of the residuals include Ghana
and Sri Lanka.
28The results displayed in Panel A in Table 3 refer to test scores in science, for which there are a few more
observations available than for test scores in math. Nevertheless, the results do not change with the use of math
scores.
21measure of Hanushek and Kimko (2000) as an instrument for the quality measure of Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009). The correlation among both variables is high (0.71), and the quality variable of
Hanushek and Kimko (2001) should not in￿ uence attainments levels and enrollment rates directly
except as an instrument for the quality of education. Furthermore, the high value of the F-test in the
￿rst stage regression suggests the results do not su⁄er from a weak instrument problem. Findings
reveal that the positive e⁄ect of the quality of education on the quantity of schooling continues
being positive and signi￿cant. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cient of quality is now higher than its
OLS counterpart in Panel B. Nevertheless, in quantitative terms the impact on attainment levels is
similar to that found in Table 2. According to column (1), a one standard deviation increase in the
quality of schooling (0.592) increases the secondary attainment levels by 5 percent.
5.3.2 Alternative measures of the quantity of education
In Section 2 we modelize higher education in a reduced form, as we do not di⁄erentiate between
secondary and tertiary education. However, in the empirical analysis we can check whether the
extensive and intensive channels can be found at the university level. To test for tertiary education,
we study the impact of educational quality on the attainment levels and enrollment rates at the
university level.
One of the problems of existing data on the quality of schooling is that the quality of secondary
education is not always related to quality at the tertiary level. For instance, according to the
international test scores compiled by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), the quality of secondary education
in the United States is lower than that in other countries with similar or lower levels of development
(see Figure 1). However, when it comes to tertiary education, American universities are by far the
best in the world. Whereas there is not a similar measure of scores in internationally comparable tests
at the university level, we can proxy the quality of tertiary education with international rankings of
the performance of universities, taken from the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking
of World Universities, as detailed in the previous section.29
The upper part of Table 4 shows the results of the e⁄ect of university quality, measured by
the performance of the top 500 universities in year 2003, on attainment levels and enrollment rates
in tertiary education, averaged over the period 2000-2010.30 Column (1) shows that higher per
capita income is positively and signi￿cantly related to higher attainment levels in tertiary education.
Moreover, even controlling for the level of development, countries with a higher number of universities
in the top 500 also have a higher share of the population with university education. In quantitative
terms, the e⁄ect implies that an increase of one standard deviation in the quality indicator (0.44) is
associated with an increase of 2.6 percent in attainment levels in tertiary education. This e⁄ect is
high since the average attainment levels during the period 2000-2010 is 11.5 percent in the sample
29The correlation of the quality measure taken from Hanushek and Kimko (2000) with the transformed measure of
university performance taken from the Shanghai ranking is 0.417 for the top 100 institutions and 0.570 for the top
500 institutions.
30We are forced to use data on university quality from 2003 because the rankings are only available from 2003
onwards.
22that includes all countries and 2.3 percent in the Sub-Saharan African region. As displayed in
columns (2-6), the results are not in￿ uenced by atypical observations and are robust to controlling
for the share of public spending on education, the share of population living in urban areas, an
indicator of ￿nancial development and cultural, political and geographical variables. Furthermore,
column (9) shows that once individuals decide to enter tertiary education, that is, controlling for the
stock, the higher the quality of universities the higher the investment rates in tertiary education.
In our model we assume that the primary level of education is publicly provided by the govern-
ment and that individuals￿decisions to invest in education mainly refer to higher schooling. The
reason is that in most countries, primary education is compulsory and ￿nanced by the government.
In fact, according to UNESCO data, in the year 2000 primary education was compulsory in every
country in the world. Therefore, we would expect that any e⁄ect of higher-quality education on
the quantity of education should be stronger in secondary and tertiary education than in primary
education.
One of the main drawbacks in testing the in￿ uence of quality on the quantity of education at
the primary level is that there are not available data on quality of primary education for a broad
number of countries and periods. Nevertheless, to have a ￿rst approximation of this relationship,
we use the measure of quality of education from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). Not surprisingly, the
lower part of Table 4 shows no e⁄ect of the quality of education on the share of individuals with
primary education and the investment rates in primary schooling; the coe¢ cient of quality is close
to zero in almost all speci￿cations.
6 Education and growth
6.1 Hypothesis to be tested
6.1.1 E⁄ect of the quality of education on development [H3]
Proposition 2 shows that under Regime III, that is, when quality is su¢ ciently high ￿ > e ￿aL;t;
all agents maximize income and thus output per worker is maximized. One implication of this
proposition will be that when quality exceeds a threshold, the larger the educational quality, the
larger the rate of growth of a country.
Our identi￿cation strategy would be to di⁄erentiate among high and low quality countries to test
whether the quality of education has in￿ uenced the economies￿growth rates of real per capita GDP.
Speci￿cally:






￿3 lnyi;t￿￿ + ￿4Xi;t￿￿ + ￿i;t
where ￿lny is the growth rate of per capita income and the explanatory variables include
standard determinants of growth. To pick up a di⁄erential e⁄ect of low and higher educational
23quality we interact the quality measure with low and high quality dummies. The low quality dummy
is equal to one if the value of quality is lower than the mean of the OECD countries minus 2 times
its standard deviation, and zero otherwise. The dummy of high quality countries is equal to one if
the quality value is higher than this threshold level. Thus, we would expect a negligible e⁄ect when
quality is below a threshold level, that is ￿1 ￿ 0, and a positive e⁄ect when quality is above that
level, ￿2 > 0.
6.1.2 E⁄ect of quality and investment rate in education on development [H4]
Corollary 1 shows that when output is relatively high, the positive impact of changes in quality
on output per worker is only due to the direct e⁄ect of quality on the human capital production
function, and not through the indirect e⁄ect of quality on the investment in higher education.





We would expect that once the quality and quantity of schooling are included as explanatory
variables in a standard growth regression, the e⁄ect of quantity would depend on the country￿ s
stage of development. In our model, given that capital markets are perfect, when countries are on
their steady state the level of investment is maximized and the indirect e⁄ect of quality on output
disappear. This hypothesis is di¢ cult to test since knowing whether a country is at its steady state
is not straightforward. Nevertheless, as an approximation, we assume that rich countries are more
likely to be closer to their steady state than poorer economies. Thus, we would expect that in high-
income economies, the quality of the educational system is more important than the investment in
the quantity of education. Empirically we test H4 with the following econometric speci￿cation:
￿lnyi;t = ￿0 + ￿1
￿
hi;t￿￿ ￿ dummyLOW




Y i + ￿3Qualityh
i;t￿￿
￿4 lnyi;t￿￿ + ￿5Xi;t￿￿ + ￿i;t
where dummyLOW
Y i is equal to one if the real GDP in 1960 is lower than the 75th percentile of
the income distribution in that year and zero otherwise. Likewise, dummyHIGH
Y i is equal to one if
the real GDP per capita in 1960 is within the top 25 percentile of the income distribution, and zero
otherwise. We should expect a positive e⁄ect of the quality of education on growth (￿3 > 0). On
the other hand, the e⁄ect of the investment rate in education should be higher in those countries
that are further to their steady states, ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 ￿ 0.
6.2 Empirical results
We test H3 in Table 5, in which the average growth rate of per capita income for the period 1960-
2004 is regressed on the initial per capita income, to re￿ ect convergence in incomes across countries,
and other standard determinants of growth, such as the physical capital investment share, the
public spending share, the imports plus the exports divided by GDP and the in￿ ation rate. We use
24Hanushek and Kimko￿ s (2000) data on the quality of education since the variable is available for a
broad number of countries, including those with low and high educational quality, as well as those
with very low and very high income levels. Therefore, we estimate a cross-sectional equation by
OLS.31 The e⁄ect of the quality of education on the per capita income growth rates is examined in
column (1). Results show a positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient of the quality indicator,
suggesting that, other things being equal, countries with a better-quality educational system have
experienced, on average, higher growth rates in the per capita income. However, according to our
model, the positive e⁄ect of the quality of education on the growth of income should be observed
only when the quality of education is above a threshold level. Certainly, when we split the quality
e⁄ect between low and high quality countries our results show that whereas the estimated coe¢ cient
of the quality of education is not signi￿cant in countries with quality at the bottom end of the
distribution, higher-quality educational systems have a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect in
most of the economies (column (2)).
On the other hand, hypothesis [H4] states that the quality of the educational system is more
important than the investment in the quantity of education in high-income economies, which should
be closer to their steady state. We start by testing the e⁄ect of investment in education, measured
by the enrollment rates in secondary schooling, on growth rates. Our results, displayed in column
(3), show that higher enrollment rates are positively and statistically signi￿cantly related to higher
growth rates in per capita income over the period 1960-2004. Moreover, in line with the theoretical
predictions, column (4) shows that the e⁄ect is stronger in economies that were relatively poor than
in countries with per capita incomes in the top 25th percentile of the distribution of income in 1960.32
Finally, in column (5) we test H3 and H4 in the same speci￿cation. In line with the previous
￿ndings, results show that the e⁄ect of the quality of education on growth is positive and statistically
signi￿cant only when quality is relatively high. Furthermore, once we control for the quality of
education, the coe¢ cient of the enrollment rate in the top-income economies stops being statistically
signi￿cant, whereas the estimated coe¢ cient of the enrollment rates in the bulk of lower-income
economies continues being signi￿cant.33
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) are the ￿rst to show that once the quality of education is taken
into account the e⁄ect of the average years of schooling in an otherwise standard growth equation
vanishes. In Table 6 we take Hanushek and Kimko (2000) results as a benchmark and show that the
31Using Barro and Lee￿ s (2001) dataset, we have also tried to estimate a dynamic panel data model that controls
for country-speci￿c e⁄ects with the system GMM estimator. However, even using a low number of lags in the set of
instruments, the reduced number of observations makes this estimator less reliable, as re￿ected by the speci￿cation
tests.
32The dummy for high-income countries takes the value of 1 if the real GDP per capita is higher than $6142.51,
which is the value of the 75th percentile in the distribution of real GDP per capita income in 1960, and zero otherwise.
33The results are robust to the cuto⁄ point of top-income countries. Speci￿cally, the results are similar if the split is
made with the top 20th or top 10th percentile of high-income economies in 1960. Moreover, the results are also robust
to the measure of quality by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), although in this case the coe¢ cient of the interaction
term of the investment rate with the low income dummy lowers signi￿cance when we test H3+H4. Furthermore, if
instead of measuring quantity of education with the enrollment rates, we measure quantity with the attainment levels
in secondary education, our results still hold.
25e⁄ect of quality and quantity of education on growth di⁄ers according to the degree of quality and
the level of development of the economy. Columns (1) and (2) display similar results are those found
by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), that is, the positive coe¢ cient of the average years of schooling
(column 1)) disappears once a measure of the quality of education is included in the set of controls
(column 2)). Going one step further, column (3) shows that the positive e⁄ect of quality on growth is
found only when quality is relatively high, which leads to the suggestion that quality is not growth
enhancing unless students achieve a minimum level of knowledge. When including the e⁄ect of
quality and quantity together ￿ see column (5)￿we ￿nd the in￿ uence of quantity is di⁄erent in low
and high income economies. When the e⁄ect of quality is accounted for, whereas the in￿ uence of
quantity disappears in high income economies, we still ￿nd a positive in￿ uence of quantity on growth
in lower income countries.
Overall, the results show that whereas Hanushek and Kimko￿ s ￿ndings hold for the whole sample
of countries, depending on the level of quality and the level of development of the economy several
nuances can be made to this general result. Following the predictions of our theoretical model we ￿nd
that in order the quality of education to increase the economic performance of the economies, quality
has to be above a threshold level that guarantees that the individuals have reached a minimum level
of knowledge. Second, in most of the economies not only an increase in the quality of education but
also an increment in the quantity of schooling is associated to a higher income per capita growth
rate. However, in countries at the top end of the income distribution increases in the quality of
education are more growth enhancing than increases in the quantity of schooling.
7 Conclusions
So far, most of the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital and development has
focused mainly on the quantity of schooling. This paper reconsiders the role of human capital by
emphasizing the importance of the qualitative aspects of education and their e⁄ect on schooling
decisions about higher education. Our proposed theory shows that, when primary schooling is
compulsory and publicly provided, educational quality may a⁄ect economic growth by increasing
the extensiveness ￿ expanding access to more agents￿ , as well as the intensiveness ￿ increasing the
investment made by each agent￿ of the accumulation of human capital beyond primary education.
Our results further suggest that educational quality plays a central role in the composition of human
capital and thus in the development process.
Using cross-country data, the paper presents empirical evidence showing that the extensive and
intensive channels are important factors in the accumulation of higher education. In particular,
countries with a higher quality educational system are those with higher attainment levels and
higher investment rates in secondary and tertiary education. In contrast, consistent with the fact
that primary education is publicly provided and compulsory in most parts of the world, higher
quality scarcely a⁄ects primary attainment levels and primary enrollment rates. These results are
not driven by omitted variables, are robust to several measures of educational quality and are not
in￿ uenced by atypical observations.
26This paper also extends Hanushek and Kimko (2000)￿ s results, who were the ￿rst to show that
in the estimation of a standard growth equation, once a measure of quality is accounted for, the
positive coe¢ cient of the average years of education stops being statistically signi￿cant whereas the
positive e⁄ect of the quality of schooling remains signi￿cant. In line with the predictions of the
theoretical model, it is shown that the positive in￿ uence of the quality of education on economic
growth is only found in countries in which the quality of education is relatively high, suggesting that
for quality to be growth enhancing the individuals need to acquire a minimum level of knowledge.
Moreover, when quality and quantity of education are included as potential determinants of growth,
not only quality but also quantity is growth enhancing in the less developed countries, whereas the
results show a predominant e⁄ect of quality over quantity in the top income countries.
From this paper we can derive some interesting policy implications. First, when seeking to pro-
mote human capital formation, policy makers usually focus on expanding access to education, while
paradoxically forgetting the qualitative aspects. According to our theoretical and empirical results,
working to improve educational quality could be an extremely powerful and e⁄ective policy approach
since the e⁄ect of quality on the stock of human capital formation is driven by two di⁄erentiated
e⁄ects; in addition to the indirect e⁄ect of increasing incentives to invest in higher education ￿ quality
enhances the stock of human capital of higher education due to both the extensive and the intensive
channels￿we also ￿nd that the quality of education has a direct e⁄ect that is distinct from the indi-
rect one. That is, quality is good in itself since it reveals the degree of e⁄ectiveness of accumulating
human capital. It should be noted that we are not claiming that a generalization of education is not
a legitimate policy aim in and of itself. Rather, we are emphasizing the importance of the quality
of the educational system.
Second, the existence of quality in higher education remains a major challenge in the developing
world, and its implementation requires a long term perspective, implying changes in educational
institutions, laws, and policies. A possible short-term solution for local communities could be to
promote programs in which prestigious foreign educational institutions open branches in developing
countries with a growing demand for higher education but lacking educational systems of adequately
high quality. Renowned universities and higher educational institutions operating beyond their own
borders could help such developing countries to increase human capital formation and work their
way out of poverty.
A logical extension of this work would be to analyze the determinants of educational quality
by endogenizing the quality of the educational system. In this context, it would be interesting to
analyze the policy implications of increasing educational quality in detail. This would be crucial
if the goal is to identify ways to stimulate development in poor economies. In sum, there appears
to exist enormous potential for researchers and policy makers to focus on the qualitative aspects of
education, and with this paper, we are only scratching the surface.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
30If e YaL < Y I
ss holds, it implies that the following order of the parameters e YaH < e YaL < Y I
ss <
Y II
ss < Y III
ss holds too, so that the only possible equilibrium is under the Regime III. First, we show
that law of motion of Y III







Substituting equation (8) into the law of motion of Y III
t+1(see equation (12)), we obtain after some
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t = 0; because ￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿ < 1:
QED:
Proof Corollary 1. Under Regime III the output per worker is given by
Yt+1 = (￿Yt ￿ ￿I￿
t;aL ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I￿
t;aH)￿(￿￿aL￿(1 + I￿
t;aL)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿aH￿(1 + I￿
t;aH)￿)1￿￿
If we take the derivative of Y III
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 Table 2
Dependent variable: Education at the secondary level
H1 H2
Attainment level (EducationSEC





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
QualityHK
60−90 0.005a 0.005a 0.004a 0.004a 0.003b 0.003b 0.007a 0.008a 0.007a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lny60 0.064a 0.086a 0.007 0.005 0.031 -0.016 0.222a 0.219a 0.201a
(0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
d+ 0.350a 0.264a 0.259a 0.295a 0.266a 0.345a 0.342a
(0.063) (0.037) (0.044) (0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037)
d− -0.313a -0.275a -0.277a -0.264a 0.264a -0.354a -0.335a




PSEduc60−90 0.029a 0.029a 0.026a 0.034a
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
lnurb60−90 0.094a 0.093a 0.087a 0.102a
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020)


















Constant -0.385b -0.590a -0.367b -0.355b -0.479a -0.336c -1.382a -1.384a -1.232a
(0.167) (0.129) (0.139) (0.158) (0.159) (0.185) (0.197) (0.197) (0.225)
R2 0.428 0.603 0.677 0.677 0.698 0.783 0.719 0.754 0.762
Countries 72 72 66 66 63 63 71 71 71
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent
respectively. Dependent variable is the share of population 25 years and above with secondary education (columns 1-6) and
enrollment rates in secondary education (columns 7-10).Table 3
Dependent variable: Education at the secondary level
H1 H2
Attainment level (EducationSEC





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A- Measure of quality: Barro and Lee (2001), pooled OLS
QualityBL
t−5 0.006b 0.004c 0.003 0.002 0.005c 0.003 0.007b 0.007b 0.006b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
lnyt−5 0.089a 0.103a 0.042 0.042 0.058c 0.057 0.183a 0.178a 0.166a
(0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
R2 0.392 0.485 0.548 0.564 0.608 0.681 0.655 0.792 0.795
Countries 40 40 37 37 35 35 40 40 40
Obs. 84 84 73 73 68 68 80 80 80
B- Measure of quality: Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), OLS
QualityHW
64−03 0.052c 0.061c 0.072b 0.072b 0.056 0.088 0.089b 0.071b 0.073b
(0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.037) (0.065) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031)
lny60 0.036 0.061b 0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.013 0.162a 0.149a 0.157a
(0.027) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.058) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
R2 0.192 0.403 0.503 0.522 0.622 0.670 0.637 0.785 0.788
Countries 45 45 43 43 41 41 44 44 44
C- Measure of quality: Hanushek and Woessmann (2009), IV
QualityHW
64−03 0.084c 0.124a 0.120b 0.116a 0.093 0.184c 0.177a 0.177a 0.187a
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.073) (0.098) (0.048) (0.043) (0.050)
lny60 0.026 0.031 0.012 0.008 0.023 0.092c 0.135a 0.124a 0.131a
(0.027) (0.021) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
R2 0.169 0.393 0.543 0.557 0.621 0.706 0.609 0.786 0.781
Countries 44 44 42 42 40 40 43 43 43
F-test ﬁrst-stage 26.15 23.76 35.44 34.52 12.42 8.76 22.22 20.78 18.92
Additional d+- col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 col. 5 d+- EducSEC
t−τ
Controls PSEduct−τ YearsComp FDt−τ FE
lnurbt−τ
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. Dependent
variable is the share of population 25 years and above with secondary education (columns 1-6) and enrollment rates in secondary
education (columns 7-10). In panel A dependent variable is measured in period t and explanatory variables also include time dummies.
In panel B and C dependent variable is measured as an average over the period 2000-2010.Table 4
Dependent variable: Quantity of education, averaged 2000-2010
H1 H2
Attainment level (Educationt) Enrollment rates (
•
ht)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A- Measure of quantity: Tertiary Education
Quality
univ−ranking
2003 0.061b 0.062b 0.065b 0.064b 0.063b 0.059c 0.082 0.112a 0.085b
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.053) (0.032) (0.035)
lny1960 0.056a 0.054a 0.031b 0.030b 0.034b 0.025 0.179a 0.185a 0.179a
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
R2 0.502 0.724 0.738 0.739 0.738 0.756 0.648 0.814 0.816
Countries 82 82 75 75 73 73 71 71 70
B- Measure of quantity: Primary Education
QualityHW
64−03 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001c -0.001c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
lny60 -0.024 -0.034 0.034 0.044 0.057 0.061 0.028 0.020 0.013
(0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051) (0.053) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017)
R2 0.042 0.127 0.227 0.254 0.316 0.461 0.041 0.542 0.551
Countries 72 72 66 66 63 63 71 71 71
Additional d+- col. 2 col. 3 col. 4 col. 5 d+- Educt−τ
Controls PSEduct−τ YearsComp FDt−τ FE
lnurbt−τ
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c stand for signiﬁcance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.
Dependent variable is the share of population 25 years and above with secondary education (columns 1-6) and enrollment rates
in secondary education (columns 7-10). In panel A dependent variable is measured in period t and explanatory variables also
include time dummies. In panel B and C dependent variable is measured as an average over the period 2000-2010.Table 5
Dependent variable: Average Growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1960-2004
H3 H4 H3-H4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lny60 -0.0090a -0.0097a -0.0108a -0.0093a -0.0099a



























(I/GDP)60−90, (G/GDP)60−90, Trade60−90, Inﬂation60−90
R2 0.560 0.613 0.534 0.569 0.653
Countries 72 72 72 72 72
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and
10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively. Quality of education is measured through
scores in international comparable test, taken from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).Table 6
Dependent variable: Average Growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1960-2004
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) H3 H4 H3-H4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lny60 -0.0102a -0.0102a -0.0106a -0.0092a
























(I/GDP)60−90, (G/GDP)60−90, Trade60−90, Inﬂation60−90
R2 0.490 0.567 0.616 0.503 0.635
Countries 72 72 72 72 72
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signif-
icance level respectively. Quality of education is measured through scores in international comparable
test, taken from Hanushek and Kimko (2000).